Does the Expectation Hypothesis Hold at the Shortest End of the Term Structure? by Uesugi, Iichiro & Yamashiro, Guy M.
Hitotsubashi University Repository
Title
Does the Expectation Hypothesis Hold at the
Shortest End of the Term Structure?
Author(s) Uesugi, Iichiro; Yamashiro, Guy M.
Citation Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, 50(1): 71-85
Issue Date 2009-06
Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Text Version publisher
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10086/17468
RightDOES THE EXPECTATION HYPOTHESIS HOLD AT THE




Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University




Department of Economics, California State University




This paper examines the predictability smile at the shortest end of the term structure. The
existence of a predictability smile has been well documented: spreads between long rates and
short rates are able to forecast subsequent movements in interest rates well, provided the
horizon is three months or less or two years or more. The predictive power of the spread at the
shortest maturities, however, has not been adequately investigated. This is a potential
shortcoming of the existing literature as a projection of the predictability smile to the shorter
maturities is not a guarantee that the expectations hypothesis holds. In Japan, a positive spread
between the forward and the spot rates has insuﬃcient predictive power for the future spot rate
innovations, while a negative spread has near-perfect predictive ability. Further, we provide
evidence that this result is not unique to Japan, as we ﬁnd this “asymmetric predictability” to
be a feature of the very short-term money markets of the U.S., U.K. and Italy.
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Do long-term interest rates reﬂect expected future short-term rates? Or, put more precisely,
does the implied forward interest rate
1 forecast the future spot interest rate? According to the
rational expectations theory of the term structure, the answer is yes. Most empirical
investigations of the term structure, however, have rejected this prediction. Because the validity
of the expectations hypothesis is fundamental to term structure theory, a large literature has
been built around the relatively simple question of whether forward rates, or yield spreads, can
forecast future spot rates. One area of research has been to examine how predictability varies
across diﬀerent maturities. The consensus is that yield spreads are able to predict the future spot
rate better at shorter (three months or less) and longer (two years or more) horizons than those
in between. Moreover, a graph of the slope coeﬃcients, in a regression of realized spot rates on
forward rates, displays a smile-shaped pattern referred to in the literature as the predictability
smile.
The focus of this paper is to examine the predictive power of the forward interest rate at
the shortest end of the term structure, where the forecast horizon is only one or two days. In
this case, given the existing empirical ﬁndings, we may expect the forward interest rate to
easily predict the future spot rate. On the other hand, if market institutions are such that one-
time random shocks have large distortional eﬀects, it may be that the predictive ability of the
spread worsens. To investigate this issue, we introduce a pair of very short forward interest
rates that have not, as of yet, been utilized by researchers: the “tomorrow next” (TN)r a t ea n d
the “spot next” (SN) rate. Both have the same maturity as the overnight (ON) rate, but their
contract terms are predetermined either one day (TN) or two days (SN) before procurement.
The ON, TN,a n dSN rates are all found in the Japanese money market. This market is
characterized by several speciﬁc institutional requirements set by the Bank of Japan (BOJ).
First, any ﬁnancial institution that holds reserves in its BOJ provided current account, is
required to have a non-negative reserve balance at end of each day. Second, all depository
institutions are required to meet its reserve requirements by the end of the reserve maintenance
period. The requirements are “asymmetric” in that ﬁnancial institutions are penalized only when
they are short of their respective reserve requirements. When ﬁnancial institutions expects a
high probability of running negative reserves, not only do they have strong demand for reserves
which raises the expected value of the overnight interest rate but also they have strong
incentives to secure the reserves amount with forward procurement contracts. These incentives
possibly distort the relationship between the ON, TN,a n dSN rates as implied by the
expectations hypothesis.
We ﬁnd that in the Japanese money market, positive forward-spot rate spreads have
insuﬃcient predictive power for a subsequent movement in the future spot rate, while negative
spreads have near-perfect predictive ability. This “asymmetric predictability” is consistent with
the “asymmetric penalties” for overdrafts, and provides strong evidence that at the very short
end of the term structure, institutional constraints can result in a sharp break of the
predictability smile. Furthermore, this asymmetry is not unique to Japan, as we ﬁnd that a
negative spread has signiﬁcantly better predictive power (at times near-perfect predictability)
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1 Throughout the paper, we use the terms “implied forward interest rate” and “forward interest rate” interchangeably.than a positive spread in the U.S., U.K., and Italian money markets. Even though we have no
solid evidence that the relevant institutional structures are identical across these countries the
fact that ﬁnancial institutions are penalized for negative reserve positions in all of them, may
explain the asymmetric predictive ability of the spread.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II, we brieﬂy summarize the existing literature.
In section III, we take a closer look at how institutional factors constrain the behavior of
participants in the Japanese short-term money market. In section IV, we test the predictive
ability of the spread at the shortest maturities in Japan. The estimation results for the U.S.,
U.K., and Italy are presented in section V. Section VI concludes.
II. Existing Literature
The relationship between the forward interest rate and the future spot interest rate has
produced a large body of literature. The primary focus of the research has been to test the
rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure. Under the expectations hypothesis, the
forward rate is a combination of a shorter spot interest rate and a longer spot rate with twice
the maturity of the shorter one.
2
Let i1,t be the interest rate on the shorter (one-period) bond and i2,t be the interest rate on
the longer (two-period) bond. Under the expectations hypothesis, investors are indiﬀerent
between holding the longer maturity bond or a series of shorter maturity bonds. In other words,
the current long-term rate is equal to the average of the expected short-term rates over the




where et+1 is the forecast error orthogonal to the time t information set. Subtracting i1,t from
both sides of equation (2), and assuming that the forward interest rate, ft,t+1, is the unbiased
estimator of i1,t+1 yields
i1,t+1,i1,t=ft,t+1,i1,t+et+1, (3)
which provides the testing equation:
i1,t+1,i1,t=a+b [ ft,t+1,i1,t]+et+1 (4)
with null hypotheses, a=0a n db=1. Since the error term, et+1, is uncorrelated with the right-
hand side regressors, OLS provides consistent coeﬃcient estimates.
b has been estimated over a range of maturities, from two weeks to ﬁve years, and for
diﬀerent market instruments,
3 including Treasury bills, Certiﬁcates of Deposit (CDs),
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2 The use of these maturities is standard in the literature.
3 Although U.S. Treasury securities (bills, notes, and bonds) are generally regarded as closest to the theoretical ideal
because of their negligible default risk, and no call provisions after 1985, other market instruments have also been used
for analysis. In this case, however, we limit our discussion to U.S. dollar denominated assets. See Mishkin (1991),Eurodollars,
4 and Commercial Paper (CP) . Cook and Hahn (1990), and Rudebusch (1995)
summarize the main results of the literature as follows:
(i) Estimates of b are signiﬁcantly less than one for almost all instruments, data sets, and
maturities.
(ii) Estimates of b for interest rates of short maturities (from two weeks to two months)
are signiﬁcantly positive.
(iii) Estimates of b for interest rates of medium maturities (from three months to twelve
months) are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
(iv) Estimates of b for interest rates of long maturities (more than one or two years)
appear to be signiﬁcantly positive.
While the “predictability smile,” outlined by points (ii) through (iv), is of great interest to
economists,
5 result (i), the failure of the null of b=1, is the most signiﬁcant of these results.
This implies that the forward rate is a biased estimator of the future spot rate, which is
inconsistent with the expectations hypothesis.
In addition to these standard estimations, other studies use long rates with maturities more
than twice as long as the maturities of the short rates. In these non-standard estimations, since
the errors overlap, the standard error of b must be corrected for serial correlation. Simon
(1990), Campbell and Shiller (1991), Campbell (1995), and Roberds and Whiteman (1999)
report the results from these estimations, with ﬁndings similar to those above. It must be
emphasized, however, that none of these studies, standard or nonstandard, test if the
expectations hypothesis holds at the shortest maturities.
6
III. Institutional Structure of Japan’s Very Short-Term Money Market
7
In this section, we take a closer look at the organization of Japanʼs short-term money
market. Participants in the very short-term money market are for the most part limited to
ﬁnancial institutions, and, many of them have few, if any, alternatives to short-term money
market instruments. While most of the participants are primarily concerned with satisfying
monthly reserve requirements, they also worry about maintaining non-negative (end-of-day)
reserve levels. Thus, elements aﬀecting the daily ﬂow of funds are closely monitored. These
factors include government expenditures, the central bankʼs market operations, and other market
participantsʼ procurement/investment behavior. We begin by documenting the marketʼs
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Hardouvelis (1994), and Jorion and Mishkin (1991) for studies of assets denominated in currencies other than U.S.
dollars.
4 See Jegadeesh and Pennacchi (1996).
5 There have been many attempts to explain the observed pattern. For example, the improved forecasting
performance of the spread at the longer horizons may imply some long run predictability arising from business cycle
eﬀects. Likewise, the inability of the spread to forecast the future spot rate for medium term securities may be due to
the central bankʼs success, at the three to twelve month horizon, in smoothing interest rates. See Roberds and Whiteman
(1999) and Rudebusch (1995) for more details.
6 The sole exception (that the authors are aware of) is Saito, et al. (2001).
7 This section is based on interviews conducted with people in charge of money market transactions at money market
brokerages, city banks, foreign banks, and the central bank (Bank of Japan).participants, and then discuss how these participants respond to changes in the procurement
environment.
We focus our discussion on the period prior to the introduction of the zero interest rate
policy (zirp) by the Bank of Japan. Following the introduction of zirp, money market interest
rates, as well as the interest rate spreads were near zero, which makes the examination of the
expectations hypothesis almost meaningless.
8
1. Market Participants
We focus on markets with large amounts of very short-term transactions, namely the
unsecured call market, the Euroyen market, the forex swap market, and the repurchase
agreement (repo) market. The repo market diﬀers somewhat from the other markets in that
funds are invested and raised by putting up collateral. When collateral values are deducted,
however, the rate in the repo market, under normal conditions, should be the same as in the
other markets. Table 1 summarizes the main players on both the investment and procurement
sides of the Japanese very short-term money market.
It is clear that there are few procurers of funds in the market. The main players are limited
to city banks, foreign banks, and securities ﬁrms needing funds to hold bonds. On the
investment side, there is a greater diversity of participants, and, in contrast to the procurement
side, players are ﬁxed in particular markets. Investment trusts, for example, invest only at the
overnight (ON) rate because a portion of their funds must be available within the day due to the
nature of their investments. Similarly, agricultural cooperative banks and life and non-life
insurers, tend to allocate a great portion of their funds to the ON market. If, and when, they do
decide to adjust their position, they do not put their funds into the tomorrow next (TN) market,
but instead move to longer-term markets, such as the one-month and three-month bond markets.
The main reason investors participate only in certain markets is that the opportunity cost of
being unable to lend is much smaller than the various penalties incurred in the event of an
overdraft. Because of this, we focus the remaining discussion on procurers of funds, and outline
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8 Note that the Bank of Japan has abandoned its zirp since June 2006. However, we have not examined if the current














Note: Modiﬁed from chart 3 in Inaba et al. (2001).
TABLE 1. MARKET PARTICIPANTS IN JAPANʼS VERY SHORT-TERM MONEY MARKET
Investment trusts, foreign banks
Japanese banks
Japanese banks (domestic branches)
Investment trusts, regional banks, second-tier
regional banks, agricultural cooperative banks, life
and non-life insurers, trust banks
Investment








Japanese bankstheir behavior in the ON and TN markets.
2. Main Players on the Procurement Side of the Market
In order to understand the procurement behavior of securities ﬁrms and banks it is
important that we make a distinction between the requirements faced by these institutions.
There are two types of requirements with respect to the reserve level in Japan: (a) monthly
reserve requirements, which are calculated from the deposit amount of each ﬁnancial institution
and must be met within a reserve maintenance period, and (b) positive end-of-day reserve
levels. Securities ﬁrms need only satisfy (b), while banks must meet both (a) and (b) . If
institutions do not fulﬁll the respective requirements, they pay a penalty of the discount rate
plus 3.75% (in case of failing to satisfy (a)) or the discount rate plus 6% (in case of failing to
satisfy (b)).
(1) Securities Companies
While securities ﬁrms are exempt from monthly reserve requirements, they do face
possible overdraft penalties if they fail to maintain a non-negative end-of-day reserve balance.
Their ability to procure at the ON rate is limited for the following reasons. They tend to
actively use the repo market, where bonds and cash are traded, and, by custom, settlements are
not carried out on the day of the transaction, t+0, but on the following day, t+1, or even later.
Securities ﬁrms, therefore, rarely turn to the ON market if they are in need of very short-term
funds, and instead rely heavily on the TN or later markets. Because participants on the
investment side of the very short-term money market are aware of this, credit lines for
securities ﬁrms on the ON unsecured call market are either non-existent or extremely limited. In
addition, concerns over whether clerical procedures
9 for ON market procurements will go
smoothly, further reduces the incentives for securities ﬁrms to raise funds in the ON market.
Thus, it is generally accepted that securities companies are active participants in the TN market,
but not the ON market.
(2) City Banks and Foreign Banks
In contrast to securities ﬁrms, both city banks and foreign banks must satisfy their reserve
requirements by the end of the maintenance period, and must maintain a non-negative end-of-
day reserve balance. Because banks forecast the amount of funds they will need approximately
two days in advance, they generally know how much money they will need on a particular day,
with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Hence, these banks are in a position to choose the
market, ON or TN, in which to raise funds. As previously discussed, however, players on the
investment side of the short-term money market tend to participate in a speciﬁc market, usually
the ON market. For this reason, those in charge of investments at these ﬁrms are more
concerned with keeping labor costs down than with continually searching for the best returns.
As a result, they simply set rates high enough to earn a small positive amount of interest each
day. The resultant low rates provide a strong incentive for banks to mainly borrow in the ON
market.
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9 Clerical procedures include communications through the short-term funds transaction conﬁrmation system and
delivery of promissory notes.Yet, despite all the “certainties” surrounding the market, reserve shocks, or unexpected
changes in economic activity aﬀecting the level of bank reserves, are prevalent and result in
signiﬁcant market uncertainty. Reserve shocks are a serious concern for banks because large
shocks increase the probability of negative end of day reserve levels, which incurs a stiﬀ
penalty from the central bank. Furthermore, at the end of the reserve maintenance period, banks
face further penalties if they fall short of their reserve requirements. Under these circumstances,
banks increase their demand for reserves. In addition, they prefer to raise a portion of the
desired amount of funds on the TN market, even if they must pay a higher rate, rather than
waiting an additional day to raise funds on the ON market. This incentive is even stronger for
foreign banks operating in Japan. Foreign banks hold fewer reserves than domestic city banks
because of their limited deposits. Thus, even moderate reserve shocks are likely to result in a
negative reserve balance for these banks.
To summarize, city banks and foreign banks generally secure funds on the ON market,
rather than the TN market, because of lower interest rates. Large reserve shocks, however,
increase the possibility of an overdraft, and/or the possibility of failing to meet reserve
requirements. To avoid the severe penalties associated with these events, banks not only
increase their demand for reserves but also prefer to obtain a certain portion of funds in the
forward market rather than waiting to participate in the ON market.
IV. Estimation of Predictability: The Case of Japan
This section implements a series of estimations to measure the predictive ability of the
forward-spot spread in Japan. Subsection 1 discusses the details of the data. Subsection 2
contains the results of the standard estimations testing whether the rational expectations
hypothesis of the term structure holds in the Japanese very short-term money market.
Subsection 3 contains estimation results, which are based on the institutional features of the
Japanese money market.
1. Data
To estimate the predictive ability of the forward-spot spread, we rely on the ON, TN,a n d
SN rates from the unsecured call market, which, in terms of amount outstanding, is by far the
largest, of the four very short-term money markets. The diﬀerences in the contracting options
between the ON, TN,a n dSN are illustrated below:
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considerably larger than either the TN or SN markets.
10 Our estimations rely on the average of
the end-of-day bid and ask quotes.
11 The data are from Bloomberg, and are available on a daily
basis. The sample begins on 4/11/1996, the date when the database begins providing data, to
2/12/1999, the date of the introduction of zirp by the Bank of Japan. The total number of
observations is 607. Note, however, that the number of observations is signiﬁcantly smaller for
the SN rate possibly because transaction amounts are relatively smaller in this market, and
therefore, quotes are often not recorded. Summary statistics are presented in table 2. Notably,
the TN and SN rates appear to be higher than the ON rate, on average.
2. Base Estimation
We begin by estimating the standard equation based on the rational expectation hypothesis
as discussed in section II. Let ONt be the interest rate on a one-day maturity spot contract, TNt
be the interest rate on a one-day maturity one-day forward contract, and SNt be the interest rate






2 ,ONt +g' Ht+et+2, (6)
with null a=0a n db=1. Note that both equations include a vector of binary dummy variables,
Ht, which contains a series of calendar eﬀects. For example, in the case of (5), if day t+1 is the
end of a quarter, the dummy variable dmsdt=1, and zero otherwise.
12 Also included in Ht are
dummies indicating the last day of the month, but not the quarter (dotht), the end of the reserve
maintenance period (drrt), the date of a monetary policy change (d980910t), the day preceding
a one-day holiday (dho1pt), the day following a one-day holiday (dho1st), the day preceding a
three-day or longer holiday (dho3pt), and the day following a three-day or longer holiday
(dho3st).
13 Estimation results are reported in table 3. To document how the value of b is
aﬀected by the inclusion of calendar dummies, the table also includes the “baseline” estimation
results, with Ht excluded.
The ﬁrst thing to notice is that the bs are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from both zero and one at
the 1% level. For equations (5) and (6), the coeﬃcients range between 0.12 and 0.16. These
results are not consistent with the existing literature on the predictability smile, as an
extrapolation of the existing smile toward the shortest end of the term structure would predict
much higher predictability. This is clearly not true in the Japanese money market. It should also
be noted that the null of a=0 is rejected at the 1% level.
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10 One market participant interviewed believed the ON market to be about ten times larger than the TN market.
11 We also obtained daily averages of the ON and TN rates from the Fund Brokers Association. We do not present
estimation results based on these data, however, partly because we lack similar information for the SN rate, and because
we obtain qualitatively similar results to what is presented in the paper.
12 In the case of (6), the dummies indicate day t+1 or t+2.
13 Other calendar eﬀect dummies such as those for day of week are not included in our estimation. Previous studies
on the development of the call rate in Japan, including Uesugi (2002), do not ﬁnd that they are signiﬁcant.3. Asymmetric Predictability Estimation
The institutional structure of the Japanese money market presented in section III implies a
diﬀerent set of speciﬁcations from the standard ones in (5) and (6). Because penalties are only
incurred for daily negative reserves, and not for non-negative reserves, we expect there to be an
asymmetry in the predictive ability of the interest rate spread. Sizeable shocks to the market
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS
0.118 1.18
607 0.464 0.093 0.21 0.78
607 0.426 0.096 0.15 0.72
0.21
0.41
0.000 0.039 −0.23 0.14
607 0.000 0.035 −0.23 0.21
346 0.460
346
346 0.059 −0.16 0.35















Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
***,
**,a n d
* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%,5 %, and 10% levels, respectively.











































































0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000raise the probability for each bank to end the day with negative reserves. Fearing a negative
reserve balance, banks increase their demand for reserves, which possibly raises the expected
value of the overnight interest rate of ONt+1 . Furthermore, banks prefer to secure funds
immediately, at the TNt rate, rather than waiting an additional day and paying the ONt+1 rate.
This behavior biases the TNt rate upward, which violates the rational expectations hypothesis.
In contrast, when market participants are less concerned about the negative reserve level at the
end of day, in which case the expected rate of ONt+1 tends to decrease, the procurement
behavior will not bias the relationship between the TN and the ON rate.
Hence, we present a set of modiﬁed speciﬁcations, speciﬁcations with two split dummy
variables:
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
***,
**,a n d
* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%,5 %, and 10% levels, respectively.
TABLE 4. ASYMMETRIC PREDICTABILITY ESTIMATION WITH SPLIT DUMMIES


















































































2 ,ONt  Ir
TNt+SNt
2 ,ONtC0 +g' Ht+et+2
(8)
where I (•) is a dummy variable equal to one when the equation is satisﬁed and zero otherwise.
The null hypotheses are b1<1a n db2=1. b1<1 implies that ﬁnancial institutions deviate from
the rational expectations hypothesis due to end-of-day overdraft penalty. The estimation results
are presented in table 4. The table indicates that b1 in both equations (7) and (8) is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent not only from zero, but also from one, while b2 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one.
We are, therefore, unable to reject the null in this case. The estimate of b2 in (8) is slightly
larger than the one in (7).
In addition to the eﬀect of the penalty for end-of-day overdrafts, we examine the eﬀect of
the penalty for failing to satisfy monthly reserve requirements. One day before the ﬁnal day of
the reserve maintenance period, depository institutions have an additional incentive to avoid
penalties incurred by the failure to satisfy the monthly reserve requirement, which further
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
***,
**,a n d
* indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%,5 %, and 10% levels, respectively.
Coeﬃcients for other dummy variables and constant are not shown in the table.
TABLE 5. ASYMMETRIC PREDICTABILITY ESTIMATION WITH SPLIT DUMMIES AND































0.3884deviate these institutions from the rational expectations hypothesis. Therefore, we introduce
another set of variables with which to examine the eﬀect:
ONt+1,ONt=a1+b1(TNt,ONt) I (•>0)+b11(TNt,ONt) I (•>0)drrt




2 ,ONt) I (•>0)
+b11(
TNt+SNt
2 ,ONt) I (•>0)drrt
+b2(
TNt+SNt
2 ,ONt) I (•C0)
+b21(
TNt+SNt
2 ,ONt) I (•C0)drrt+g' Ht+et+2 (10)
The estimation results are presented in table 5. The null hypotheses are b1<1, b2=1, b11<0,
and b21=0. We expect the largest deviation from the rational expectation hypothesis to occur
when drrt=1, in which case we have b1+b11<b1<1. As in table 4, b1 in both equations (9)
and (10) are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent not only from zero, but also from unity, while b2 is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity. Note, however, that both b11 and b21 are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. Hence, penalties for not satisfying the monthly reserve requirement do not
signiﬁcantly contribute to the deviation from the rational expectations hypothesis.
V. Estimation of Predictability: U.S., U.K., and Italy
In this section, we provide estimates of the predictive ability of the forward-spot rate
spread in the money markets of a few other developed countries. Due to the availability of the
data, our investigation is limited to the U.S. Euro Dollar, U.K. Euro Sterling, and Italian
Domestic Lire markets. Summary statistics for each of these currencies are provided in table 6.
For these currencies, estimation results of asymmetric predictability under the split dummy
speciﬁcation are presented in table 7.
It is clear that there exists a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between b1 and b2 across all the
markets. Moreover, b1 is always smaller than b2. A negative spread between the forward and
the spot rates has signiﬁcantly better predictive power than a positive spread. When we
consider the U.K. Euro Sterling, b2 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one, which implies that
the negative forward-spot rate spread has near-perfect predictive ability. Furthermore, the b2
estimates for Italian Domestic Lire are close to one and, at times, not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from one at the 1% signiﬁcance level. Finally, only the b2 estimates in the U.S. Euro Dollar
market are always signiﬁcantly less than one.
VI. Conclusion
This paper reviews the relationship between the forward interest rate and the spot interest
rate at the shortest maturities. Our analysis is centered upon the Japanese very short-term
HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [June 82money market. The primary reason for this is that, based on extensive interviews with market
participants, we have a clear picture of the institutional set-up of the market. We ﬁnd that in
the Japanese money market, a positive spread between the forward and spot rates has
insuﬃcient predictive power for future spot rate innovations, while a negative spread has near
perfect predictive power. In other words, when the forward rate minus the current spot rate is
negative the rational expectations hypothesis holds, and when it is positive the expectations
hypothesis fails. We posit that the structure of the Japanese short-term money market may
explain this “asymmetric predictability.” Penalties for negative end-of-day reserves limit the
ability of market participants to behave according to the rational expectations hypothesis, while
penalties for failing to satisfy monthly reserve requirements do not have any additional impact.
Furthermore, we obtain similar estimation results using other currencies: U.S. Euro Dollar,
U.K. Euro Sterling, and Italian Domestic Lire. In all of these markets, the predictive power of a
negative forward-spot spread is signiﬁcantly higher than a positive spread. For the U.K. Euro
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Note: Figures are percentages. The sample period is from 1/9/1995 to 12/29/1999.
TABLE 6. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR OTHER CURRENCIES
0.346 4.56 6.91
1250 5.426 0.340 4.34 8.00
1250 5.445 0.321 4.66 7.06
US Euro Dollar
2.47
1249 0.000 0.125 −1.39 0.91
1250 0.000 0.122 −1.34 1.53
1249 5.416
1250 −0.024 0.172 −1.53 1.22
1250 −0.019 0.186 −1.50









Note: Figures are percentages. The sample period is from 1/20/1995 to 8/8/2002.
0.996 3.38 8.28
1910 5.877 1.015 3.13 8.34
1910 5.865 1.356 2.41 39.88
UK Euro Strerling
3.03
1909 −0.001 1.095 −33.69 17.28
1910 −0.001 1.245 −33.69 34.13
1909 5.890
1909 0.018 0.922 −33.94 3.05
1910 0.012 0.924 −33.94










Note: Figures are percentages. The sample period is from 4/5/1988 to 12/30/1998. We omit the sample period when
Euro has been introduced.
2.964 38.78
2714 10.057 3.020 1.69 36.81




−0.002 2.042 −13.53 14.45
2714 −0.001 1.985 −14.06 18.41
2713 10.079
2713
2713 1.820 −8.75 12.50
2714 0.402 1.768 −10.19
0.411Sterling in particular, the predictability coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one when
the forward-spot spread is negative. What is common to all of these countries, Japan, the U.S.,
the U.K., and Italy, is that ﬁnancial institutions are penalized for end of day overdrafts.
14 Even
though we have not collected additional evidence of institutional similarities across money
markets in these countries, we expect that this overdraft penalty is a contributing factor to the
observed asymmetry.
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